On the 63rd anniversary of atomic bombing on
Hiroshima on Aug 6, 1945, I would like to
present following part of Gar Aloperovitz's
book THE DECISION TO USE ATOMIC BOMB.
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Among the many remaining puzzles surrounding the
decision to use the atomic bomb, perhaps the most
intriguing concern two of the nation's highest World
War II military leaders. A few years after Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were destroyed, Admiral William D. Leahy
went public with the following statement.
It is my opinion that the use of the barbarous
weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material
assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese
were already defeated and ready to surrender.....
My own feeling was that in being the first to
use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common
to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not
taught to make war in that fashion, and wars
cannot be won by destroying women and children.
Leahy was not what one might call a typical critic
of American policy. Not only had the five-star admiral
presided over the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff(and the
Combined American-British Chiefs of Staff), but he
had simultaneously been chief of staff to the commander-in-chief of
the army and navy, serving Roosevelt in that
capacity from 1942 to 1945 and Truman from 1945 to 1949.
Moreover, he was a good friend of Truman's and the two
men respected and liked each other; his public criticism
of the Hiroshima decision was hardly personal.
We can imagine what it would mean today if General
Colin Powell were to go public with a similar critique,
say, of the massive bombing he presided over as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff during the
1991 Persian Gulf War--and on decisions made by his
friend President George Bush.
A similar puzzle concerns Dwight D.Eisenhower, the
triumphant Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force who directed British and American operations
against Hitler--and also, subsequently, of course,
president of the United States. In the midst of the
Cold War--shortly after his famous Farewell Address
criticizing the "military-industrial complex"--
Eisenhower also went public with a statement about the
Hiroshima decision.
Recalling the 1945 moment when Secretary of War Henry
L.Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used
against Japanese cities, Eisenhower stated:
During his recitation of the relevant facts,
I had been conscious of a feeling of depression
and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings,
first on the basis of my belief that Japan was
already defeated and that dropping the bomb was
completely unnecessary, and secondly because I
thought that our country should avoid shocking
world opinion by the use of a weapon whose
employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory
as a measure to save American lives. It was my
belief that Japan was, at that very moment,
seeking some way to surrender with a minimum
loss of "face".･････
Something clearly had caused Leahy and Eisenhower to
break the unwritten rule that requires high officials
to maintain a discreet silence in connection with
controversial matters about which they have special
knowledge. But as we shall see, Leahy and Eisenhower
were not the only military figures who broke the rule.
Moreover, less than a year after the bombings an
extensive official study by the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey published its conclusion that Japan would
likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing,
without a Soviet declaration of war, and without an
American invasion.
Again, it is not only the substance of the conclusion
reached by this official body, but the fact that it
was made public and received wide publicity, which
forces itself into awareness, now, nearly fifty years
after the fact.
GAR ALPEROVITZ: THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB
(VINTAGE BOOKS A Division of Random House, Inc.
New York, 1995)pp.3-4
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Is Prof.Alperovitz wrong?
Aug 6, 2008(Wed)
NISHIOKA Masanori
